Abstract|We describe the use of symmetry for veri cation of transistor-level circuits by Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation (STE). We present a new formulation of STE which allows a succint description of symmetry properties in circuits. Symmetries in circuits are classi ed as structural symmetries, arising from similarities in circuit structure, data symmetries, arising from similarities in the handling of data values, and mixed structural-data symmetries. We use graph isomorphism testing and symbolic simulation to verify the symmetries in the original circuit. Using conservative approximations, we partition a circuit to expose the symmetries in its components, and construct reduced system models which can be veri ed e ciently. Introducing X-drivers into switch-level circuits simpli es the task of creating conservative approximations of switch-level circuits. Our empirical results show that exploiting symmetry with conservative approximations can allow one to verify systems several orders of magnitude larger than otherwise possible. We present results of verifying Static Random Access Memory circuits with up to 1.5 Million transistors.
I. Introduction
Many high performance hardware designs are custom designed at the transistor-level to optimize their area and performance. This makes it necessary to verify them directly at the transistor-level. Veri cation at this level of abstraction allows one to handle many low-level circuit modeling issues such as bidirectional pass transistors, transistor sizes, node capacitances, and charge sharing. Common examples of such custom-designed hardware units include memory arrays which are found in instruction and data caches of microprocessors, cache tags, and TLBs. Many of these hardware units consist of components which have considerable regularity in their structure, or in the way they handle data. This paper focuses on formalizing this regularity as symmetry and shows how symmetry can be used with symbolic trajectory evaluation (STE) to e ciently verity large designs.
Past e orts on verifying memory arrays using STE have been quite successful. Results have been presented on the veri cation of large systems containing over 10 5 transistors, and over 10 4 memory bits 19], 6]. However, these approaches do not scale up well for much larger systems. As results in this paper show, switch-level analysis can become a serious bottleneck in a STE veri cation ow that does not utilize symmetry.
By exploiting symmetry with the use of STE, it is pos- sible to verify systems that are orders of magnitude larger than previously possible. We present empirical results for the veri cation of static random access memory (SRAM) circuits of varying sizes, including one with over 1.5 million transistors. Furthermore, empirical results show that our techniques scale up linearly or sub-linearly with SRAM size, indicating that one could verify circuits much larger than our benchmarks.
Our veri cation approach builds on three ideas: circuit partitioning, structural analysis, and conservative modeling. Many systems, viewed as a whole, do not possess symmetries that can easily be exploited, but they are made up of smaller components which can. One can exploit the symmetry in the components by partitioning the larger system, verifying the smaller components, and composing the veri cation results.
We describe two forms of symmetries. Structural symmetries arise from similarities in the structure of a system, e.g., by replication of system components. Data symmetries arise from similarities in handling of data values in the system. Previous work exploiting symmetry in formal veri cation in 7] , 12] has focussed only on aspects of structural symmetry. Work in in 16] handles structural and a form of data symmetry. Aggarwal et. al describe a form of data symmetry in 1]. Our work contributes a new formulation of data symmetry, and the idea of mixed structuraldata symmetry. We have found these other forms of symmetry useful in verifying many common digital building blocks. Consider for example an address decoder, which when given an input address selects the output word having this address. Changing the value of a single decoder input results in a symmetric exchange in the values at the di erent decoder outputs. Such instances of mixed symmetry cannot be expressed by the other approaches. Structural symmetries in a transistor-level circuit can be detected and veri ed through a purely structural analysis of the system by doing circuit graph isomorphism checks. Other forms of symmetries can be veri ed through symbolic simulation.
Symmetry in a system imposes a partitioning of the system state space, where permutations of the same state appear in the same partition class. Once symmetry has been checked, one need verify the system for only one representative from each partition class. We exploit this property by constructing a conservative model of the system which provides full functionality only for the representative case. This approximation results in large savings in the system excitation function representation size.
In the remainder of this paper, Section II describes past work on applications of symmetry to veri cation. Section III presents our new formulation of STE, together with the necessary mathematical background. This section also describes how excitation functions are generated from switch-level circuits. Section IV describes our notion of symmetry as an excitation function preserving transformation. The next three sections describe how symmetry with conservative approximations, and circuit partitioning can be employed to e ciently verify circuits. The application of these techniques to verify a SRAM circuit has been shown in Section VIII. The SRAM veri cation results are presented in Section IX.
II. Previous Work
Petri nets have long been used to describe systems consisting of communicating concurrent processes. Huber et al. presented early work on exploiting symmetry in petri nets 15]. In 20], Starke proposes an algorithm to compute the generators of the symmetry group for petri nets. Jensen 17] describes the application of symmetry to construct condensed versions of state spaces of concurrent systems described by colored petri nets. The work shows that for reachability properties, the unreduced state space satises a property, if and only if the condensed state space satis es the property. Typically the work in this area focusses on reachability analysis, rather than more general temporal properties, and does not consider the added complexity (and the concomitant payo ) of symbolic state space representations.
Work on exploiting symmetry for automated formal verication techniques is quite recent. Emerson and Sistla 12] , 11] show how to exploit symmetry in model checking with the CTL* temporal logic. In a system M consisting of many isomorphic processes, the symmetry in the system is captured in the group of permutations of process indices de ning graph automorphisms of M. Similarly, symmetry in a speci cation formula f is captured by the group of permutations of process indices that leave f invariant. Given a permutation group G, which is contained in both groups, one can construct a quotient structure M, such that for a start state s, and the equivalent state s in M, M; s j = f i M; s j = f holds. This is the correspondence theorem, which is the central result of their work. This work, however, does not address the complexities that arise from symbolic representations of the state space. Furthermore, this work considers only structural symmetries.
The work by Clarke et al. 7] , 8] takes a slightly more general approach than that by Emerson. It views symmetry as a transition relation preserving permutation, not just permutation of indices of identical processes. Given a symmetry group G acting on a Kripke structure M, one can construct a reduced structure M G . The correspondence theorem in this work shows that if there is a CTL* formula f, such that all the atomic propositions in f are invariant under G, the f is true in M if and only if it is true in M G . This work discusses the construction of the reduced transition relation which is represented symbolically.
There are a number of di erences between our work and that by Clarke et al., or Emerson et al. We represent the system transition by means of an \excitation function". Naturally, when we consider symmetry in a system, we examine the symmetry in the excitation function. We model the state of a circuit by associating two \atoms" with each circuit node, a positive atom, and a negative atom (section III-A). Having two atoms for each circuit node allows us to model and exploit a richer set of symmetries in circuits. This contrasts with these other symmetry-based veri cation approaches which have only one \atom" (atomic proposition) associated with each state holding element in a circuit. Our formulation of symmetry allows us to dene structural and data symmetries in a system. We verify that these symmetry properties exist in the system, and then we construct a reduced model from a conservative approximation of the circuit. This avoids the need to construct a model of the complete system and then reducing it by forming a quotient structure. Such an approach allows us to verify huge systems, including one with 262144 state holding elements (or 2 262144 states). Emerson or Clarke view symmetry as a permutation on a state graph with some desired properties, like preserving the transition relation, or a permutation of process indices which a transition graph automorphism. This approach imposes a signi cant limitation { capturing phenomena like the symmetrical behavior on the outputs of a decoder is extremely tedious, if not impossible, with their process oriented point of view. Also, in both the approaches outlined above, to be e ectively exploited, symmetry must be present in both the state transition graph, and the temporal logic formula being veri ed | the atomic propositions should be invariant under the action of the symmetry group.
In 16], Ip and Dill discuss the veri cation of large concurrent systems, where the symmetry in the system is identi ed by a special scalar-set datatype in the system description language. They view symmetry as an automorphism on the state transition graph. They describe an on-the-y construction of the reduced state transition graph. They show that safety and liveness properties which hold in the reduced state graph also hold in the original system. Our approach contrasts with this, in that we start with a transistor netlist without any special attributes or datatypes. Of course, once we have this netlist, we manually identify symmetries in the design, and the parts that should be reduced. After this identi cation, is done, the symmetry checks and the construction of the reduced model are automated. By concentrating on a single instance of the assertion to be veri ed, we use conservative approximations to aggressively reduce the state space and verify safety properties. In the work by Ip and Dill, the quotient state graph is an exact model that can be used for safety and liveness properties with fairness constraints.
In comparing our work with these previous approaches, one must also take into account the expressiveness of the logic of STE described in this paper with other temporal logic such as CTL. The STE next-time temporal operator allows one to express properties over a nite time period, which equals the maximum depth of the next-time operator. This precludes the speci cation of liveness properties of systems, which can be speci ed in CTL. Of course, this expressiveness comes at a price in terms of the size of systems that can be veri ed. Aggarwal, Kurshan and Sabnani have exploited symmetry for the veri cation of the alternating bit protocol, a standard benchmark for protocol veri cation techniques 1]. Applying reduction techniques speci c to this problem, and some simplifying assumptions, they reduce the large state space using machine homomorphisms. They show that for verifying properties about the given state machine, it su ces to verify the desired properties on the reduced machine. This approach to a some degree approximates our notion of data symmetry by considering the data symmetry between 0 and 1 in the transmitted messages. However, the approach does not consider many important issues like detecting, and verifying symmetry, and the automated construction of symmetry reduced state space. Our view of circuits is quite abstract. We view circuits as consisting of a set of nodes and an excitation function which determines how the circuit nodes get updated at every time step. This abstract viewpoint can capture behavior at various levels of abstraction ranging from detailed switch-level models to register transfer level and high-level behavioral models. This section describes the domain of values circuits operate over, and the structure of this domain. Section III-B how the excitation functions are generated and represented.
Intuitively, knowledge about about the state of a circuit is built up of information atoms. The state of a circuit consists of values at the circuit nodes. Thus, we need to de ne atoms associated with every circuit node, as described below.
De nition 1: Let N denote the set of nodes of a circuit. For every node n of a circuit, we de ne two atoms, n + and n ? , indicating that node n has value 1 or 0 respectively. Let A denote the set of all the atoms of a circuit. Figure 1 shows the set of atoms for a two node circuit. An atom for a node restricts the value of the node. A set of atoms of a circuit restricts the values on the circuit nodes.
For example, the atom set fa + ; b ? g indicates a is 1, and b is 0. This motivates the following de nition of a circuit state.
De nition 2: Given the set of all the atoms of a circuit, A, we de ne a circuit state S to be any subset of A, and S to be the set of all possible states, i.e., S = 2 A . State set S, together with the subset ordering forms a complete lattice, where states are ordered according to their \information content," i.e., how much they restrict the values of the circuit nodes. For example, the structure of the state domain for the circuit in Figure 1 is illustrated in Figure 2 . In this diagram we indicate the set of atoms in each state. As the shaded regions indicate, states can be classi ed as being \partial", \complete", or \con icting". In a partial state, some nodes have no corresponding atoms while others have at most one. In a complete state, there is exactly one atom for each node. In a con icting state, there is some node n for which both atoms n ? an n + are present. Such a state is physically unrealizable|it requires a signal to be both 0 and 1 simultaneously. Con icting states are added to the state domain only for mathematical convenience. They extend the semilattice derived from a ternary system model into a complete lattice. Our state lattice has the empty set ; as its least element and the set of all atoms A as its greatest element. The set union and intersection operations are the lub and the glb operations, respectively, in the lattice.
Most traditional presentations of switch-level models describe circuit operation over the ternary domain T . Each circuit node takes on one of the three distinct values from the set T = f0; 1; Xg, where the X value denotes an unknown or an indeterminate value. Associated with T is the partial order v T , where 8a 2 T : av T a, Xv T 0 and Xv T 1. The partial order v T is consistent with the information conveyed by the values in T since a 0 or a 1 conveys more information than an X in a circuit. The atom representation of the state domain is closely related to the ternary domain. If a circuit state contains n + , but not n ? , then node n has a value of 1. Similarly, the presence of n ? , and the absence of n + implies that n has a value of 0. If the circuit state contains neither n + , nor n ? , then n has a value of X. For example, in the circuit of Figure 1 , the set of atoms ;, fa + g, fb ? g, and fb ? ; a ? g, The behavior of a circuit is de ned by its excitation func- Figure 3 shows the excitation function for the inverter of Figure 1 . Each oval in Figure 3 is a circuit state. An arrow from one circuit state to another indicates the least constrained new state a circuit can be in after a transition from a previous state. A circuit model is de ned by its lattice-structured state-set, and a monotonic excitation function over this state-set. Formally, The behavior of a circuit can be represented as an innite sequence of states. We de ne a circuit trajectory to be any state sequence = 0 1 : : : such that Y ( i ) i+1 for all i 0. That is, the state sequence obeys the constraints imposed by the circuit excitation function. Below, the sequences 1 , and 2 , where (s) indicates an in nite repetition of state s, are both trajectories of the inverter of Figure 1 .
As can be seen, these trajectories always obey the constraints imposed by the excitation function of Figure 3 We can extend the ordering on elements of S, to sequences of elements of S. This extended ordering is denoted as v. In the switch-level model, a MOS transistor network consists of a set of nodes connected together by transistor switches. Nodes are of two types: input, and storage. An input node provides strong signals from sources external to the network, like power, ground and data inputs. Storage nodes are internal to the circuit. They have states which are determined by the operation of the network and can retain these states in the absence of applied signals. Each storage node is assigned a size in the set f0,...,kg to indicate in a highly idealized way its capacitance relative to other nodes with which it may share charge. The state of a node is represented by one of three logic values: 0, which indicates a low, 1 which indicates a high, and an X which represents an unknown or uninitialized value. Input nodes are assigned a size w. w is greater than the size of all the nodes as well as the strengths of all the transistors in the network.
A MOS transistor is a three terminal device with node connections gate, source, and drain. This device acts like a voltage controlled switch, depending on the value at its gate. Normally, there is no distinction between source and drain terminals { the transistor is a symmetric, bidirectional device. We distinguish between three types of transistors: n-type, p-type, and n-type depletion. A transistor acts as a switch between source and drain controlled by the state of its gate node. This switch may be open or closed, or it may have a conductance of unknown value. These three conduction states, open, closed and unknown are represented by the values 0, 1, and X respectively.
Each transistor has a strength in the set fk + 1,...,w ? 1g.
The strength of a transistor indicates its conductance when turned on relative to other transistors which may form part of a ratioed path. Figure 4 shows a switch level circuit, consisting of the nodes a, b, c, k, s, t, p, Vdd, and GND, and the transistors T1, through T8. The node sizes and the transistor strengths are indicated by the numbers in parenthesis. The storage nodes in the circuit are s and t, which have sizes of 1, and 2, respectively. All transistors have a size of 3, except T6, which has a size of 4. The input nodes in the circuit, a, b, c, k, Vdd, and GND have a size of 5. The states of input nodes Vdd, and GND are xed at 1, and 0, respectively. Nodes in a switch-level network are connected together by directed paths of conducting transistors. Each path originates at a source node, and terminates at a destination node. The path has a strength, which roughly indicates the approximate amount of charge that can be supplied along the path from the source to the destination. In case of a path from an input node to a storage node, the strength of the path equals that of the weakest transistor in the path. In case of a path connecting two storage nodes, the strength of the path equals the size of the source node. The state of a node depends on the states of the source nodes of the strongest paths to this node.
C. The behavior of switch-level circuits
Most switch-level analysis and simulation tools partition the transistor-level network into a set of communicating components, termed channel connected subnetworks (CCSNs). Each CCSN consists of a set of storage nodes that can share charge, together with the transistors that connect them. Behavior within a CCSN can be di cult to analyze because of the bidirectional nature of transistors, and the multiple signal strengths. The interaction between the CCSNs is simpler. Each CCSN may be viewed as a nite state machine, with inputs, internal state, and outputs. The inputs consist of the transistor gate nodes, and input nodes connected to transistor source or drains. The storage nodes hold the CCSN state, and a subset of the CCSN nodes constitute the set of observable outputs of the CCSN. Given its initial state, and the present inputs, this sequential machine computes a new state, and new outputs. The entire transistor network is thus modeled as a system of communicating sequential machines. Figure 5 shows the circuit of gure 4 partitioned into CCSNs CCSN1, and CCSN2. The steady-state response function of a CCSN describes its sequential behavior. This function speci es how the new CCSN node states are computed, given the initial storage node states, and the values at the inputs and the gates of the CCSN, and given that the transistor states are xed long enough for the nodes to stabilize.
The excitation function of a CCSN gives the steady-state response of the CCSN nodes, when the transistors are held xed in states determined by the initial storage node states and the inputs. An important property of the excitation function is its monotonicity over the f0; 1; Xg values. This property implies that if some inputs of this function were set to X, and a given output were 0 or 1, then changing the X inputs to 0 or 1 does not alter the output. This property is particularly important for veri cation, in view of the \information-content" ordering of the three values. We use the unit-delay model to describe circuit delays. In this approach, a change in the state of a transistor gate is re ected as a change in the state of the transistor after a delay of one time-step. This time-step is used as the unit of time. In each CCSN, given the logic levels at the inputs, and the storage nodes, a new logic level is computed for each storage node according to the CCSN excitation function. Then, after a delay of one time-step, the storage nodes are assigned the new logic levels just computed.
D. Computing the steady-state response
The steady-state response of a switch-level network can be obtained by a symbolic Boolean analysis of the network 5], 4]. In this approach, the problem of determining the network response is cast in terms of determining paths through the channel graph of a CCSN. The result of the analysis is a number of Boolean expressions which state how the ternary state of the CCSN is updated in each time-step.
To express and compute ternary quantities in the switchlevel model in terms of Boolean operations, a \dual rail" encoding is used. Each ternary quantity x, is represented by a pair of Boolean values, x:L, and x:H , as shown in Table I. For each node n, we introduce two Boolean variables, n:L, and n:H . The analysis problem can be speci ed as: for each node n in the circuit, derive the Boolean formulas N:H , and N:L, which represent the encoded value of the steady-state response at the node as a function of the initial node states.
The goal of symbolic analysis of a network is to derive Boolean expressions indicating the conditions under which conducting paths are formed in the network. To express these concepts more precisely, we rst de ne a channel graph, which has a vertex for each circuit node, and an edge for the channel of each transistor in a switch-level circuit.
The CCSN de ned earlier in section III-C, is a connected component in this graph. The analysis process examines one CCSN at a time. The discussion ahead pertains to the analysis of a single CCSN. A rooted path in the channel graph is a directed path between two nodes. A rooted path p originates at root(p), and it terminates at dest(p). Paths have a length, equal to the number of edges in it. A path can have a length of 0. The strength of a path re ects its relative charge transfer capacity. Figure 6 illustrates paths of di erent types in the channel graph for the circuit of Figure 4 . p1 is a path of zero length, with a strength of 5. p2 is a path of strength 3 from the input node Vdd to the storage node t. p3 is a path of strength 1 from s to t. Note that the di erence in strengths of p2, and p3 arises from the fact that p2 conveys charge from an input node which can potentially supply unlimited amount of charge, whereas node s can only convey the stored charge it has through path p3.
A rooted path is termed a de nite path, if none of the transistors in the path are in the X state. The steadystate response of a node depends only on the paths to the node that are not blocked. Informally, a path is blocked if some intermediate node in the path is the destination of a stronger de nite path. The charge from the stronger path overrides the charge from the weaker path. For example, if the transistor corresponding to path p4 in Figure 6 is on, then, p2 and p3, the weaker paths to node t, do not a ect the steady-state response of t. If all the unblocked sources of charge to a node drive it to 0 (or 1), then the steady-state response equals 0 (or 1). Otherwise, if unblocked sources drive a node to con icting values, then the node's response The Boolean expressions generated in the process of symbolic analysis are represented by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), where leaves denote Boolean variables and constants, and nodes denote Boolean operations. Each node of the DAG represents a Boolean formula, and often there is considerable amount of sharing in a DAG structure for the steady-state expressions for the storage nodes of a CCSN. Figure 7 shows the steady state expressions for nodes s, and t in component CSSN1 of the circuit in Figure 4 .
Section III-A describes the behavior of systems by an excitation function Y : S!S over sets of atom. The system response obtained by the analysis above can be easily converted to our \atomcentric" point of view by a simple transformation. To ensure consistency between the two representations, this transformation ensures that if the high-rail n:H (low-rail n:L) value of a node is 1, then the corresponding circuit state does not include n ? (n + ). Since the presence of n ? precludes the hi-rail from being 1, (dual true for lo-rail, and n + ), the transformation below converts the dual-rail DAGs to an atomcentric DAG. 1. Transform every x:L to x + , and every x:H to x ? . 2. Convert AND nodes to OR, and OR nodes to AND. 
E. Trajectory Evaluation
In Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation (STE), the specication language consists of a set of trajectory assertions. The simplest form of trajectory assertion has the form A =) C], where A, and C are trajectory formulas. A, the antecedent of the trajectory assertion describes the stimulus to the circuit over time, and C describes the expected 
Next time: (NF) is a TF if F is a TF.
The Boolean expressions occurring in domain restriction operators, having the form E ! F, give these formulas a symbolic character. They can be thought of as \guards," i.e., F must hold for the cases where E evaluates to true. For the theoretical development, however, it is convenient to rst consider the form where E is restricted to be either 0 (false) or 1 (true). A scalar trajectory formula obeys this restriction throughout its recursive structure. The extension to the symbolic case then simply involves considering the valuation of the expressions for each variable assign- sequence of states that can be constructed, given the constraints speci ed in a trajectory formula. For example, in the de nition above, the de ning trajectory for a formula consisting only of a + , is a sequence, the rst element of which is the set fa + g, and the remaining elements are the empty set ;.
While F is not a trajectory, we may combine it with the successor function Y , to get the de ning trajectory, F , of F. It can be shown that F is the unique weakest trajectory satisfying F. We outline the construction of F ahead. Let F = 0 Thus, to verify the truth of an assertion, all we need to do is construct a de ning sequence, and a de ning trajectory, and check that the former is weaker than the latter. Furthermore, we need check only an initial pre x of the two sequences, which is equals the \depth" of C. The depth of a formula F, denoted by d(F), equals the maximumnesting of the next time N operator. This is stated as corollary 1.
IV. Symmetries of a circuit
We express both circuit operation and the speci cations in terms of sets of atoms. We can therefore express symmetries in a circuit and the corresponding transformations of the speci cation in terms of bijective mappings over atoms, named state transformations. Two types of state transformations, which alter circuit state in a \structured"manner are particularly interesting. These are the structural, and data transformations. Below, s a 1 =b 1 ; :::; a n =b n ] denotes the state obtained by simultaneously substituting atoms a 1 ,... ,a n for the atoms b 1 ,.. .,b n , respectively, in state s.
De nition 5: A structural transformation is a state transformation which swaps the atoms for two di erent nodes. For nodes n 1 and n 2 , we write n 1 $ n 2 to denote the transformation consisting of the swappings: n + 1 with n + 2 and n ? 1 with n ? 2 . Given = n 1 $ n 2 , and a circuit state s, (s) = s n + 1 =n + 2 ; n ? 1 =n ? 2 ; n + 2 =n + 1 ; n ? 2 =n ? 1 ]
De nition 6: A data transformation involves swapping the two atoms for a single node. For node n, we write n to denote the transformation consisting of the swapping of n + with n ? . Given = n , and circuit state s, (s) = s n + =n ? ; n ? =n + ]
Intuitively, a structural transformation exchanges two nodes of a circuit (by swapping their atoms), and a data transformation complements the value at a circuit node by altering a positive atom of a node to a negative atom, and vice versa. Thus, these transformations provide us with a convenient mechanism to express circuit structure and circuit data handling related issues. Composing structural and data transformations allows us to express a variety of circuit transformations. To simplify notation, we will denote more complex transformations as a list of elementary transformations.
Our uni ed view of state transformations and excitations as functions mapping states into states allows us to succinctly express symmetry in a circuit as an excitation preserving transform. This closely parallels the de nition of symmetry in 7] as a transition relation preserving state permutation.
De nition Depending on their constituent state transformations, symmetry properties may be classi ed into one of the following three categories:
Structural symmetry | consists entirely of structural transformations.
Data symmetry | consists entirely of data transformations.
Mixed symmetry | consists of both structural and data transformations.
Consider, for example, the circuit shown in Figure 9 . This circuit consists of k identical latches. In each latch outL is a complement of the input, and outH has the same value as the input. Since the latches are identical, this circuit has a structural symmetry corresponding to the swapping of any pair of latches i and j, such that 0 i; j < k: Verifying a circuit involves checking a familyof assertions against the circuit model. The presence of symmetry properties in the circuit often allows us to dramatically reduce the number of assertions that need to be veri ed. This is because if an assertion G holds, and is a symmetry property of the circuit, then the assertion (G) also holds. This is elaborated below.
We can extend to be a bijection over state sequences by applying to each state in the sequence. We can also extend state transformation to be a bijection over temporal formulas. First we de ne the extension of to Trajectory formulas(TFs). The e ect of applying to a TF F is to replace every atom a in F by (a). This idea is carried further, where may be applied to an assertion. The result of applying to the assertion A =) C] is the assertion (A) =) (C)], which is also denoted by ( A =) C]).
Since a symmetry property is an excitation function preserving transformation, it follows fairly intuitively that the structure of the de ning sequence and the de ning trajectory of a TF F should remain invariant with respect to . This is formalized below in lemma 2, and lemma 3.
Lemma 2: If temporal formula F has de ning sequence F , then its transformation (F) will have de ning sequence (F) = ( F ).
Proof: This can be proved by induction over the structure of TFs. Details are shown in 18]. Lemma 3: If is a symmetry property of a circuit model M, then its de ning trajectories for any temporal formula (Theorem 1) 2 Thus, proving that is a symmetry property of a circuit allows us to infer the validity of a transformed assertion once we verify the original. For example, suppose we verify that Latch 0 in Figure 9 operates correctly for input value 1, and also prove that the transformations de ned by Equations 1 and 2 are indeed symmetry transformations. Then we can infer from Equation 1 that for all j, Latch j operates correctly for input value 1, and from Equation 2 that Latch 0 operates correctly for input value 0. Furthermore, by composing these two transformations, we can infer that for all j, Latch j will operate correctly for input value 0.
VI. Verification of symmetry properties
To exploit symmetry, we verify an assertion A =) C], and given a set of symmetry properties, S = f 1 ; 2 ; : : :; n g, we can conclude that 1 (A) =) 1 (C)], 2 (A) =) 2 (C)], .. . 3 (A) =) 3 (C)] all hold. However, before drawing this conclusion, one must verify that every element of S is actually a symmetry property. The typical set of symmetry properties we work with is a group. Below, we give two basic de nitions from group theory which we use ahead.
De nition 9: Set S is a symmetry group for a model structure M = hS; Y i i every element of S is a symmetry property of M, and the following properties hold:
1. The identity element e is in S, where e (a) = a. The de nitions above imply that rather than test every element of a set S for the symmetry property, it su ces to check only the generators of S. Thus, it is possible to prove the correctness of an entire set of assertions by simply verifying that each member of a set of generators for a group of transformations is a symmetry property.
For example, (1) in section IV represents a total of k(k?1)=2 symmetry transformations, corresponding to the pairwise exchange of any two latches. In general, one could argue that this circuit would remain invariant for any permutation of the latches. Consider the transformation mapping the 6 atoms for each Latch i (two each for nodes in.i, outL.i and outH.i) to their counterparts in Latch (i). We could prove that each such transformation is a symmetry property, but this would require k! tests. Instead, we can exploit the fact that any permutation can be generated by composing a series of just two di erent permutation types. The \exchange" permutation swaps values 0 and 1, while the \rotate" permutation maps each value i to i + 1 mod k. Thus, proving that the state transformations given by these two permutations are symmetry properties allows us to infer that is a symmetry property for an arbitrary permutation .
So, once the generators of a symmetry group are identied, the next step is to verify that they are indeed symmetry properties. We verify structural symmetries of a circuit by circuit graph isomorphism checks, and we verify data and mixed symmetries using symbolic simulation based techniques. We describe these techniques in sections VI-A, and VI-B.
A. Structural symmetry property veri cation
We can verify structural symmetries in our circuit models by checking for isomorphisms in the circuit-graph network. Since the circuit analysis tool we use (Anamos 5]) derives its representation of the excitation function from the network, any isomorphisms in the network graph imply structural symmetries in the excitation function. While it is also possible to verify structural symmetries using symbolic simulation, such an approach requires performing switch-level analysis on the circuit. This analysis can be prohibitively expensive (Table II) for circuit components such as array cores with their large CCSNs.
Consider the problem of determining if n 1 $ n 2 is a symmetry property in Circuit 1 (Figure 10 ). If this symmetry were to hold in the circuit, Circuit 2 which is obtained from Circuit 1 by swapping the labels of nodes n 1 , and n 2 should be isomorphic to Circuit 1. To perform this isomorphism test we use a graph coloring based algorithm described in 10], 9]. This algorithm, which is described below, converts a circuit graph network into a pseudo-canonical form. This allows a fast and e cient test for isomorphism between two networks.
Given the circuit graph for a switch-level circuit, we rst construct a coloring graph which contains a transistor vertex for each transistor in the circuit, and a node vertex for each node and primary inputs in the circuit. The edges of this graph connect transistor vertices and node vertices, and they correspond to the node-transistor interconnections in the circuit. Since there are no edges which connect only two node vertices, or two transistor vertices, the coloring graph is bipartite. Once the coloring graph is constructed, the vertices of the graph are \colored" with integers. Based on isomorphism invariant vertex properties such as the number of edges incident on a vertex, all the vertices in the graph are assigned an initial color. Vertices are recolored repeatedly using a hashing function which combines the colors of the neighboring vertices, until all the vertices are colored uniquely. Then the nodes and transistors of the circuit are sorted to yield what is termed as the quasi-canonical form of the circuit network. This coloring and sorting technique guarantees that two networks that are not isomorphic will be colored di erently. However, in some remote cases, it is also possible that two isomorphic networks may not be colored uniquely within a given xed number of coloring iterations. However, we have not encountered this problem in our experiments (Section IX).
The problem we need to solve is slightly di erent from the one solved above. We need to swap two nodes in the circuit, and test if the two circuits, before and after the swap, are isomorphic. This does not work directly, as the isomorphism checks work purely on the structure of the network, and they ignore the node names. So the two circuits, before and after the node name swap will still reduce to the same quasi-canonical form. We work around this by using structural labels.
A structural label is a circuit graph (or an interconnection of nodes and transistors) which satis es the following two properties:
The structural label is not isomorphic to any subgraph of the original circuit.
The label is not isomorphic to any other structural label. These properties allow us to use these labels to physically tag circuit nodes. Structural labels serve to uniquely 
Test for equality S2
Node exchange S1
Quasi-Canonical Reordering
Quasi-Canonical Fig. 10 . Veri cation of structural symmetry n 1 $ n 2 tag a node in the circuit being tested for symmetry properties. So, structural labels are attached not only to the set of nodes being swapped, but also to some of the remaining circuit nodes. While verifying symmetry properties by graph isomorphism checks, it is necessary to attach structural labels to all the input and output nodes of a circuit. However, it is not necessary to consider the state nodes during our symmetry tests. If the circuit being veri ed satis es all the assertions, then it has the desired IO behavior, and no further tests are necessary for the internal nodes. Of course, if some assertion fails, then further checks are necessary, and we may well discover a problem related to the state nodes.
Thus, to solve the problem of determining whether n 1 $ n 2 holds in Circuit 1, we can attach structural labels ID1 and ID2 to nodes n 1 and n 2 in Circuit 1, and then ip these labels in Circuit 2. We then can reduce the two circuits to the quasi-canonical form, and compare them ( Figure 10 ). The worst case time complexity for the graph coloring algorithm for a circuit with n transistors is O(n 2 log(n)). However, in practice we have seen both the time and memory scale nearly linearly with n. (Table III) .
B. Data and mixed symmetry property veri cation
Data and mixed symmetries can be veri ed by symbolic simulation. Data symmetries involve \switching polarities" of values on a node. Mixed symmetries involve \switching polarities" of the value on a node, and \exchanging" the values of two di erent nodes. To verify these symmetries it is necessary to check whether for every combination of circuit node values, the exchange and the polarity switching of the input node values results in changes in the output node values as speci ed by the symmetry property. Symbolic simulation is the ideal tool for such checks involving all possible combination of Boolean values. One symbolic Boolean variable is introduced for each circuit node. The circuit is simulated with these Boolean variables, and then with new Boolean values corresponding to the changes speci ed by the symmetry property. The results of the two simulations are compared to verify if the circuit obeys the symmetry property.
Consider, for example, the symmetry of Latch 0 speci ed in equation 2:
in.0 ; outL.0 ; outH.0 : We symbolically simulate the circuit with the symbolic value a at the input in.0, and inspect the values at the output nodes outL.0, and outH.0. If the above symmetry holds for the latch, then complementing the value at node in.0, should result in the values at circuit nodes outL.0, and outH.0 being complemented.
Consider also the mixed symmetry of Latch 0, speci ed in equation 2: in.0 ; outL $ outH.0 :
This symmetry can also be veri ed by symbolically simulating the circuit with a symbolic value a at the input in.0, and observing the outputs, outL.0, and outH.0. The equation above speci es that complementing the value at in.0 should result in the values at nodes outL.0, and outH.0 being exchanged, which can be easily checked.
VII. Conservative approximations of circuits
Intuitively, a conservative approximation of a circuit is a \reduced" version of the circuit which, given any current circuit state, imposes fewer constraints on the next state the circuit can take. In terms of values, on circuit nodes, the reduced circuit produces more Xs than the original circuit, i.e., fewer atoms in the next state. We formalize this concept below. We exploit conservative approximations to perform two important tasks:
Create reduced models which take less memory to represent.
Partition circuits to expose symmetric regions of a design.
Proving an assertion for a reduced circuit model, allows us to infer that the assertion holds for the original circuit. Theorem 3 below justi es this. The advantage of this is reduced circuit models are often a fraction of the size of the original circuit model, which results in smaller veri cation memory requirements. Conservative approximations provide a systematic way to reason about partitioned circuits, allowing us to verify the complete circuit by proving properties about each partition. This is particularly useful when the partitioning can expose highly symmetric regions of the circuit. In addition, if we can prove that a circuit has some structural symmetry, then we can create a \weakened" version of the circuit containing just enough circuitry to verify the behavior for one representative of the symmetry group. Therefore, as expected, \weakening" the model also weakens the trajectories of the model, and this immediately leads to the theorem below. Thus, proving an assertion for a conservative approximation to a circuit model allows us to infer that the assertion holds for the original circuit.
B. Partitioning circuits via conservative approximations
We can view the partitioning of a circuit into di erent components as a process of creating multiple conservative approximations. For example, suppose we partition a circuit with nodes N into components having nodes N 1 and N 2 , respectively, as illustrated in Figure 11 . The set of nodes forming the interface between the components comprise the set N 1 \N 2 . In this example, we assume the communication is purely unidirectional|N 1 generates signals for N 2 . Suppose we wish to prove a property described by an assertion A =) C], where the atoms of C are contained only in N 2 . We could then create conservative models M 1 and M 2 using the subset construction given by Equation 4 below. Taken individually, each of the two models is too weak to prove the assertion. Using the technique of waveform capture described ahead, we can record the output values generated by model M 1 and use them in verifying the assertion with model M 2 . We describe this technique in greater detail below.
We start with the idea of creating conservative approximations by removing nodes of a circuit. Let N 0 be a subset 2. Now we discuss the use of waveform capture to verify a property A =) C] for a larger design by partitioning it into smaller components and verifying these components individually. Prior to the discussion however, we prove theorem 4, which justi es waveform capture and combination. To simplify the proof of the theorem, we rst show some useful results in lemma 6, 7, and 8. Lemma 7 and 8 also appear in a modi ed form in 14]. 
To compose the results of equations 6 and 7 by applying theorem 4, the assertions and the symmetry transformations need to obey the following two constraints:
Interface constraint: The signals at the interface of M 1 and M 2 should match, i.e., 1 (W A ) = 2 (W A ).
Antecedent constraint: The trajectory formula A should be invariant under the symmetry transformations 1 , and 2 , i.e., 1 (A) = 2 (A).
Given these constraints, equations 6 and 7 may be written as j = M1 1 (A) =) 1 (W A )] and j = M2 1 (A)^ 1 (W A ) =) 2 (C)] respectively, which leads to the following:
Thus, given symmetry properties 1 and 2 , and the two constraints, we have established a new assertion. In this manner, one can establish a family of properties for the entire design by using symmetries on individual components. It should be noted that in general for a trajectory formula F, 1 (F) = 2 (F) does not imply 1 = 2 .
The antecedent constraint, 1 (A) = 2 (A) requires that 1 and 2 transform atoms in A identically. This requirement is easy to satisfy. For instance, let all the atoms in A come from the nodes of M 1 and not from M 2 . Given this, 2 , should also include those structural and data transformations in 1 Creation of a conservative approximation of a circuit intuitively means creating a reduced version of the circuit which produces more Xs than does the original circuit. The limiting case of the conservative approximation of a circuit is one whose every node produces only an X for every input sequence. Such a \strict" approximation is of little use, however. We would like to create conservative approximations in a more controlled manner, so that we can selectively disable desired portions of the circuit. The following two techniques are our means of doing so:
Attach \X-drivers" to internal circuit nodes. Strengthen transistors which are adjacent to X-drivers. An X-driver is a strong source of Xs. Attaching an Xdriver to a node is equivalent to converting the node to an input node set to the constant value X. The X-driver is analogous to the Vdd and ground nodes, which are strong sources of 1 and 0, respectively. An accompanying technique we employ to create a conservative approximation is strengthening transistors adjacent to X-drivers. Intuitively, this strengthening aids the propagation of Xs through the circuit. As will be shown later, both these techniques monotonically move all the circuit nodes towards X.
As an example, suppose we wish to create a reduced model for the circuit in Figure 5 by eliminating nodes a, b, and s. Then we could describe the remaining portions of CCSN1 by the excitation expressions shown in Figure  12 . One can see that these expressions were obtained from those of Figure 5 by simplifying the result of setting the leaves for all eliminated atoms to false. This conservative approximation could be used to verify circuit operation for the cases where node c is set to 0. We have modi ed Anamos to generate these simpli ed expressions directly, avoiding the need to ever generate a complete model. In particular, we would replace node s in the example circuit by a X-driver.
One nal task which remains is to show that the two circuit transformation techniques discussed above actually create a conservative approximation. As mentioned in section III-D, the steady state response of a node in a switchlevel network depends on all the unblocked paths to that node. In gure 13, consider the path p from src to dest. If the path were unblocked before the X-driver is attached to node n, then, two possibilities arise after the X-driver is introduced. The rst is that the path still remains unblocked, and the node response stays the same. The second is that a stronger path q from n blocks p, i.e., jqj > jp 0 j, where p 0 is a pre x of p originating at the root. In this case, the stronger path q will dominate the response at dest, i.e., dest will monotonically move towards X. The e ect of strengthening transistors adjacent to a X-driver is similar | stronger paths from the X-driver may dominate existing paths, sending their destination towards X. Note that the argument above also accounts for the case when n is on p. In such a case, the length of path q is 0.
VIII. Putting it together: Verifying a SRAM circuit
Consider the 16-bit (1 bit/word) SRAM circuit shown in Figure 14 . This circuit consists of the the following major components | row decoder, column address latches, column multiplexer (Mux) and the memory cell array core. To simplify the discussion here, many essential SRAM components like precharge column, write-drivers etc. have not been shown in the gure. This is a standard organization The machinery we have built in the previous sections allows us to verify the read or write operation for only one location and, from the symmetry in the SRAM circuit, conclude that the operation works for every location. We expand on this below, starting with a discussion of SRAM symmetries.
A. Symmetries of a SRAM Consider the decoder in Figure 15 . For any memory operation, the value of the row address assigned to nodes a. 2 Transformation i indicates that complementing bit i of the row address causes an exchange of signal waveforms for each pair of word lines j and k such that the binary representations of j and k di er at bit position i. The column address latches obey the \decoder" symmetry expressed by Equation 3 . The mixed symmetries of the decoder and the column address latches can be veri ed by symbolic simulation, where a single run of the simulator with n symbolic Boolean values at the circuit inputs is equivalent to 2 n runs of a conventional simulator with 0-1 values. For example, to verify that 0 is a symmetry of the decoder, we symbolically simulate the decoder with symbolic values s 0 and s 1 at the decoder inputs a.2, and a.3 in Figure 15 . As the simulation proceeds, we check that a substitution of s 0 for s 0 in the symbolic waveform for wl.0 (resp., wl.2) matches the symbolic waveform on wl.1 (resp., wl.3). Figure 16 illustrates the two structural symmetries of the SRAM core and column Mux combination. The row symmetry arises from the invariance of the core-mux circuit structure under permutations of the rows of the core. The column-mux symmetry arises from the invariance of the circuit structure under a swap of column address latch output pairs accompanied by a corresponding exchange of columns. For example, in Figure 16 , a swap of aH.0 and aL.0 accompanied by a swap of column 0 with 1, and a swap of column 2 with 3 is a symmetry of the circuit.
We verify the core-Mux symmetries in two parts. First we verify that arbitrary row and column permutations are symmetries of the core. Veri cation that the exchange and rotate permutation generators for rows and columns are symmetries su ces for this. This gives a total of 4 symmetry checks for the core. Next we verify the column-mux symmetry for the Mux. In the gure, the generators of the four di erent column address line pair permutations are the two permutations associated with each column address latch output pair. Therefore, two symmetry checks verify the column-mux symmetry. In general n symmetry checks must be done for the Mux in a SRAM with n column address line pairs.
B. Veri cation steps
In order to verify the SRAM circuit we go through the following sequence of steps.
1. Circuit partitioning | We partition the SRAM circuit into two parts. The rst part consists of the decoder with the column address latches. The second part consists of the memory core and the column Mux.
2. Symmetry veri cation | Using symbolic simulation we verify the symmetries of the decoder and column latches. Using circuit graph isomorphism checks we verify the symmetries of the core and the column Mux.
3. Conservative approximations | We create two conservative approximations of the SRAM (Figure 17) . In the rst model, the memory core and the column Mux are \disabled". In the second model, the decoder, the column address latches are disabled, and all the memory cells except that for location 0 are disabled. Figure 18 shows how we conservatively disable a SRAM cell by attaching X-drivers, and strengthening transistors adjacent to the Xdrivers. The gure also shows the optimization that chains of N or P transistors from Vdd or ground to an X-driver may be eliminated from the circuit | their presence does not alter circuit behavior. and the column address latches. We construct a trajectory formula W, which captures the signal values on the outputs recorded above. As discussed earlier, it can be shown that A =) W] is true.
5. Veri cation of SRAM core | Finally, with conservative approximation 2, we show that given the waveform W, and the antecedent A, the consequent C is true, i.e., A^W =) C]. From the earlier discussion in section VII, if A =) W] and A^W =) C] are both true, then we can conclude that A =) C] is true, i.e., the memory operation is veri ed for location 0. Given the symmetries of the circuit we can then conclude that the operation works correctly for every memory location.
IX. Experiments and Results
All the time and memory gures in this section have been measured on a Sun SparcStation-20. We used the Anamos switch-level analyzer to generate switch-level models 5]. We modi ed Anamos to make it possible to attach X-drivers to circuit nodes to generate reduced models (conservative approximations) of switch-level circuits. Table II shows the results of model generation for SRAM circuits of varying sizes for the full and reduced circuit models. The full circuit model contains about 73 operations for each memory bit. However, for circuits larger than 16K, it was not possible to generate the full circuit model within reasonable time or memory bounds (empty table entries). Conservative approximations of SRAM circuits, on the other hand, can be generated for much larger circuits for a miniscule fraction of the cost of the full model. The reduced model size grows proportional to the square root of the SRAM size, and its generation time and memory is proportional to the SRAM size.
To verify a structural symmetries, we do graph isomorphism checks as outlined in section VI. We have modi ed the isomorphism checking code 2] from Anamos for our purpose. Table III reports the running time and memory taken for converting one instance of the memory core or column mux permutation into a canonical circuit, and the total time to do all the isomorphism checks. The total time and memory requirements scale linearly with the SRAM size. Table III reports the resources required to check the structural symmetries. The memory core has four symmetry generators. We verify that each of these is a symmetry (columns 2,3,4) . Column 4 indicates the number of symmetry checks that are required. The column multiplexer has a number of symmetry generators equal to the number of column address lines. We also verify each of these generators (columns 5,6,7). The total time is reported in column 8. Table IV shows the time and memory required to check the decoder and column address latch symmetries by symbolic simulation. We used the Voss veri cation system 21] to verify the reduced SRAM circuit. Table V shows the running time and the memory required for verifying the write operation for location 0. In addition, we verify two other properties | that the read operation reads the value stored at location 0 (Table VI) , and that operations at other addresses do not change the data in location 0 (Table VII) . The time and memory required to verify these other operations is similar to that of the write. Much of the veri cation time and memory is taken to read in the reduced circuit model and representing it. So, it is not surprising that the time and memory requirements grow roughly proportional to the square root of the memory size.
The total veri cation time for a SRAM circuit is the sum of the times in tables II, III, IV and V. For example, to verify a 64K SRAM, 170.7 secs. are required to generate the reduced circuit model, a total of 952.4 + 3.2 secs. are required to verify the circuit symmetries, and an additional 6.0 + 6.6 + 6.1 secs. are required to verify the reduced model for all the operations. This gives a total veri cation time of 1145.0 secs. It is interesting to note that symmetry checks dominate much of this time. In the veri cation process, the only time we ever work with the complete circuit is the symmetry check phase. This partially explains the reason for the relatively large time and memory requirements of this phase. However, the circuit isomorphism code we have used is a simple modi cation of that in Anamos. There is considerable scope for reducing time and memory by developing a specialized circuit isomorphism checker without the baggage from Anamos. Circuit netlist comparison programs such as schematic-layout checkers routinely use these isomorphism algorithms to handle graphs with tens of millions of nodes and edges.
X. Conclusion
We show that exploiting symmetry allows one to verify systems several orders of magnitude larger than otherwise possible. We have veri ed memory arrays with multimillion transistors. The techniques we have developed also presented can be used in a rather straightforward manner to exploit symmetries in other hardware units like set associative cache tags, where every set is identical in structure.
One direction for future work in the short run would be to extend these ideas to verify content addressable memories. In the longer run, it would be interesting to apply these ideas to verify hardware units other than memory arrays.
Candidates for such an application include a processor datapath, where one can nd the presence of structural symmetries because of bit-slice repetition, and data symmetries arising from the datapath operations.
